Russia is on the move to become an energy superpower by spreading its influence deep into Western and Eastern energy markets. Possessing the largest reserve of natural gas in the world, Russia's domestic and foreign policies have now come to be largely determined by the energy factor. Apart from the already existing market in the West, Moscow's plan to explore Asian markets was welcomed by the major energy consuming countries such as China, Japan, and the Koreas in the East Asian region. But Russia's market expansion plans in Europe against the backdrop of the gas price row with Ukraine in January 2006 and the concurrent supply disruption have appeared as a threat to energy security of the European Union (EU) countries, which have increasingly come to depend on Moscow for their energy supplies. As a consumer bloc, the EU fears that with the market expansion plans Russia would monopolise its own energy market and may eventually gain a greater influence within Europe. Moreover, Russia shifting its attention to Asian markets has also raised concerns, despite the reassurance that it has provided in this regard, about uninterrupted supply of oil and gas to the EU. Consequently, Russia has come to be increasingly seen as an unreliable energy supplier by the Western market. Europe, which has been a traditional market for Russia's energy exports, receives a quarter of its total oil and gas needs form Russia, with the dependency of individual countries variously ranging from about 30 to 50 per cent.
European officials are concerned about Moscow's growing control over energy supply routes and distribution networks within the EU and in the former Soviet Union. In recent times Russia's energy market expansion plans have witnessed some opposition in the European Union. This opposition came in the wake of the Russian energy company Gazprom showing interest in bidding for Centrica, the largest gas distributor in Great Britain. Gazprom, which exports 30 per cent of its natural gas production to the European Union, has responded by warning importing countries that it would cut energy supplies to them and take its business to other markets if Moscow's market expansion plans in EU are curtailed. On April 20, a spokesman for the EU Energy Commissioner reacted to Gazprom's warning thus: "Russia is free to decide its market and EU is already looking for alternative suppliers." On April 24, the Chief of Transneft petroleum company, Semyon Vainshtok even went to the extent of saying that "Europe is overfed with Russian energy and every single economic manual says that excessive supplies depress prices. As soon as we turn towards China, South Korea, Australia, Japan that will immediately take away part of our oil from our European colleagues." Since a major portion of Russia's energy exports are oriented towards the West, energy flows to the European market is at a fairly low price. Russian energy companies believe that their exports are being underpaid for in the current global energy price levels, given that most of the supply deals were inked before prices started skyrocketing in 2003. With this issue heating up between the EU and Russia, a centre-right German Member of the European Parliament Elmar Brok likened Gazprom's threat to "the announcement of a Cold War with new methods."
The war of words has created a sense of caution on both sides and signalled a threat to the energy supply and market security to EU and Moscow, respectively. While the Asian market with China, Japan, the Koreas and India as customers will provide a large and diverse consumer network for Russia, the EU is keen to explore more export sources in the African, Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. During a landmark visit to China on March 21-22, 2006 President Vladimir Putin agreed to the construction of two pipelines from Russia's Far East to supply China with 60 to 80 billion cubic meters of natural gas per annum. Russia also promised to build an oil pipeline from eastern Siberia to its Pacific port of Nakhodka, which will have customers such as China, Japan and other Asian countries. On the other hand, most EU countries have already made large-scale investment in renewable and other alternative energy sources in an attempt to reduce their dependency on Russian energy. Germany, which imports about 30 per cent of its natural gas needs from Russia, recently announced a new energy plan, under which 30 billion Euro each will be invested in the construction of power plants with distribution networks and renewable energy. According to a report in Euobserver, EU leaders agreed that they should establish a single market for electricity and gas by mid-2007, boost renewable energy use by 15 per cent and bio fuel use by 8 per cent by 2015, as well as use 20 per cent less energy overall by 2020.
Ever since the Ukraine episode, the EU has grown worried about its alarming dependency on Russian supplies. It fears that Gazprom's expansion plans in Europe and its growing control of the energy market will force import dependent EU countries to pay a high price for future energy supplies. On the other hand, Moscow feels that its market expansion interests have been ignored or often prevented. Moreover, it also feels that it has been supplying cheap energy to the EU customers, for which prospective consumer countries in the Eastern market are ready to pay a higher price. The fact is that, despite concerns about mutual reliability, Russia and the EU have one of the most important energy trade ties in the world. Statistics show that Russia along with the other countries in the former Soviet Union exported above 5.3 million barrels of oil to the EU in the year 2004. And natural gas exports from Russia alone amounted to 148.44 billion cubic meters out of a total production of 589.10 cubic meters.
Russia and the EU need to look into some of the basic factors which bring them together as energy trading partners, before mutual apprehensions get translated into an energy cold war. First, neither can afford to ignore the other's interests in the current world energy scenario. Given that no other single supplier can replace energy supplies from Russia, EU countries would continue to be dependent on Moscow. At the same time, shifting the energy market completely from the West is an unrealistic option for Russia given that about 70 per cent of Gazprom's revenues come from its natural gas export, while the rest of the gas produced is sold in the domestic market at a low price. Moreover, completely redirecting the West-oriented energy supply and delivery system eastward would require huge financial investments and would also not be economically feasible.
Ever since the Arab Oil embargo, the world has witnessed petroleum fuels being used by producing countries as a political tool to gain leverage in their relations with the outside world and in times of crisis. In the case of Russia too, energy is now a tool to develop its economy and spread its influence in the neighbouring regions. Though the EU and Russia have shared strong energy trade relations for the past many decades, the alarming growth of demand and the growing price of petroleum fuels worldwide along with Moscow's search for more profitable markets in the East and West seem to have adversely affected this relationship. Current tensions between the two sides are unlikely to lead to a cut-off in supply from Russia for the above-mentioned reasons. But at the same time Europe might be forced to pay a higher price for imports from Russia in coming years. Russia's reluctance to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty, which would have helped the already existing consumer countries in terms of supply security and price also demonstrates Moscow's interest in obtaining a higher value for its exports to the EU. Current developments are likely to turn out in favour of Russia asserting itself as an energy superpower with a large consumer network including the EU and North America in the West and Asian consumers in the East.
Nepal is witnessing relative political calm after the Maoists declared a three month ceasefire to facilitate a political solution to the insurgency, which has been marked by unabated violence, threatening peace and stability in the Himalayan Kingdom. The Maoist insurgency, which originated ten years ago in April 1996, has reached a new phase. After several rounds of unsuccessful negotiations to resolve the political crisis posed by the Maoists in the past, the current situation is characterized by anxiety and hope. The anxiety is over whether a peaceful solution can be reached. Hope arises because of the fact that there seems to be a certain convergence of interests between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists. After nineteen days of demonstrations, initiated by the political parties and supported by the Maoists, the King caved in to the spontaneity of anger expressed against his rule in the streets of Nepal. With the restoration of the suspended Parliament and swearing in of Mr. G P Koirala as the Prime Minister of Nepal, the focus has now shifted to the two main actors - the SPA and the Maoists.
There are difficult tasks in front of the new government headed by G P Koirala. The perceptible uncertainty is evident as the Maoists wait for the government's announcement regarding elections to the Constituent Assembly. The new government has made an appeal to the Maoists to shun violence and give up arms. But the situation remains tricky, with the Maoists reluctant to give up arms before any concrete political settlement. Maoist support to the political process is backed by the twelve-point agreement that they signed with the political parties in November 2005, one of which stated that the political parties would form an interim government and hold elections to a Constituent Assembly. As is evident from various statements emanating from Kathmandu, the political parties have expressed their desire to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly.
Before the forthcoming elections there are certain issues that need to be thrashed out between the SPA and the Maoists. First, the question of disarming the Maoist cadres would be important before an election takes place. The Maoists, as per the agreement, have agreed that they would put their armed cadres along with the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) under some kind of UN or any other reliable international supervision so that there could be free and fair elections. It is likely that the Maoists would not agree to complete disarmament before the elections because of the existence of a trust deficit between the parties to the conflict. Therefore in their twelve-point agreement both the political parties and the Maoists have categorically stated that they expect reliable international mediation even during the dialogue process. The Maoists need to be convinced that the government is committed to an elected Constituent Assembly. As for the SPA, it needs to be convinced that the Maoists believe in the democratic process and would accept the outcome of the elections to the Constituent Assembly and their drafted constitution. It also seems impossible that the Maoists, without a credible commitment, perhaps an international guarantee, would give up their armed wing.
The Communist Party of India and its leaders played an important role in forging an agreement between the Maoists and the SPA. They were also instrumental in convincing the Maoists to declare a three-month ceasefire. How far the Indian Communist leaders would be able to convince the Maoists to adhere to the constitutional path remains to be seen. Given their recent positive role, they could indeed play a crucial part in Nepal's unfolding political future. At the same time, the Maoists want to give peace a chance due to international pressure.
The most important issue before the Constituent Assembly would be the future role of the King. It is difficult to believe that the Palace would remain a silent spectator and accept the decision of the Constituent Assembly about its future. The King still holds immense powers under the 1990 constitution and is in a position to dismiss the government using the controversial Article 127. He will remain the Supreme Commander of the armed forces until the new constitution of Nepal is written. He is an important third party and would try to retain a certain political role instead of simply being relegated to the role of a ceremonial monarch. Both the political parties and the Maoists have indicated that the future role of the King would depend on what the people of Nepal want. The existing situation is that there is certainly a consensus among the people regarding a less intrusive monarch, though perhaps people are not yet prepared for a Republic. The Monarchy as an institution still has socio-political relevance.
There is a need on the part of the political parties and the Maoists to tread carefully. They have been able to marginalize the King and there exists popular support for their efforts to draw up a new constitution. If the negotiation proves to be a long drawn one or if the Maoists leave the constitutional path, the King's position will get strengthened. Any failure on the part of the political parties could inevitably lead to the King's assumption of power. With the SPA in the process of consolidating power, the Maoists are waiting patiently for political progress along the agreed line.
India is waiting cautiously for the next political move of the Koirala government. It is also going to watch anxiously how the SPA and the Maoists work out the necessary modalities for an election to the Constituent Assembly. At the same time India is equally apprehensive that Nepal would face a deeper political crisis if the Maoists and the SPA do not reach an understanding. This will not only impinge on the credibility of the parties as political actors but in turn would strengthen the institution of the Monarchy. It is important to ensure that the Maoists do not use the cease-fire period to strengthen their armed wing and prepare for another phase of armed struggle. The resultant instability would have grave security implications for India, which shares a 1700 km open border with Nepal.
Despite the King's proclamation and the subsequent end to the 19-day anti-Monarchy protests by the seven party alliance (SPA) on April 25, 2006, Nepal is still not sure of peace and stability. The difference between the SPA and the Maoists on the new constitution seems to be the biggest challenge before the Koirala Government. Although the Maoists have declared a three-month ceasefire, they have refused to surrender their weapons before or during the elections to a Constituent Assembly. However, the decision of the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, a partner in the SPA, not to join the Council of Ministers could affect the peace talks with the Maoists.
On the night of April 24, King Gyanendra had yielded to unrelenting pressure from the pro-democracy movement and announced that the Parliament, which he dissolved in 2002, had been revived. He convened the parliament on April 28. The SPA, which spearheaded the movement for democracy, was quick to welcome the King's declaration and accepted the Royal offer. Earlier on November 22, 2005, the CPN-Maoist and Nepal's political parties had reached a 12-point agreement, which called for joint action to end the autocratic monarchy and bring about fair elections to a constituent assembly.
The international community, which criticized the King for violation of human rights during the nineteen-day protest period as well as the King's takeover of power in February 2005, welcomed the King's declarations. India welcomed the King's decision to revive Parliament and hoped that an interim government would be in place in Nepal soon. On April 25, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee said: "We await the convening of the revived House of Representatives and the installation of a government as indicated by the Seven Party Alliance. This is a victory for the people of Nepal, who have displayed extraordinary courage and reaffirmed their faith and commitment to freedom and democracy. The future of Nepal is safe in their hands."
The US, the European Union and China also welcomed the King's decision, which was a direct result of India's diplomatic initiative. On April 20, Dr. Karan Singh was despatched as special envoy to Nepal, where he called on the leaders of the SPA and the King. India's effort to bring peace and stability in Nepal continues. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) leader, Sitaram Yechuri, has gone to Nepal to discuss with SPA leaders the issue of formation of the interim government and elections to the constituent assembly. He would also hold talks with the Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai. Earlier, Nepal's Prime Minister-designate Girija Prasad Koirala had sought Yechury's help in ironing out differences between the SPA and the Maoists.
However, India is concerned about the Maoist decision. They had betrayed their ceasefire declarations in the past and used the time to replenish their weapons. The Nepal revolutionary movement has now entered its strategic offensive phase and the CPN-Maoists linkages have remained a major concern to India.
The CPI-Maoists appear to have worked out a strategic alliance with the CPN-Maoists to carve out a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) comprising areas from Kathmandu to the southern tip of Andhra Pradesh. They have also formed the Indo-Nepal Border Region Committee to co-ordinate their activities in North Bihar and along the India-Nepal border.
In this regard, on April 14 in New Delhi, at the meeting of the Chief Ministers of Maoist-infested States, Bihar's Nitish Kumar and Chhattisgarh's Raman Singh said there was immediate danger of CPN-Maoist cadres crossing over to India and making Naxalism a nationwide phenomenon. Conceding that Maoists from Nepal posed a serious threat, the Union Home Ministry, which till now had been hinting at 'ideological links' between CPI-Maoist and CPN-Maoist cadres, admitted that the two outfits provided training, arms and finances to each other.
The CPN-Maoists procure arms and ammunition from criminal gangs in the neighbouring Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, with which Nepal shares an open border, as well as from insurgent groups operating in the northeast region of India. The primary route used by the CPN-Maoists for smuggling weapons and explosives from the Indian border is the Belauri checkpoint of Kanchanpur district and Melauli checkpoint at the border of Dadeldhura and Baitadi districts, then to Bajura district and finally to Achham district of Nepal.
Interestingly, CPN-Maoist is a member of RIM (Revolutionary Internationalist Movement), and RIM believes in ultimate victory against imperialism, feudalism and globalization and the establishment of a communist society. Both outfits are part of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organization of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), and the Nepal Maoists openly declare that unless the Maoists of the South Asian region work jointly to counter 'the pernicious role of India' final victory would elude them.
At this juncture, India should continue to keep its present diplomatic channel open for mediating between the King and the political parties and discuss the future course of action without being seen as interfering in the country's internal affairs. India should ask the SPA to negotiate with the Maoists to surrender the People's Liberation Army and its arms to the civilian government and co-operate in reconstruction and development activities. Secondly, India and donor countries have to play a major role in reconstruction and development works. Priority should be given to strengthening democratic institutions and good governance. Otherwise, there is likely to be a relapse of the Maoist movement in Nepal.
The fast breeding domestic debate on the size of the nuclear deterrent is taking place in the light of India's separation plan of nuclear facilities for civilian and military purposes. The scope of the debate related to India's credible minimum deterrence is complex with reference to the continuing relevance of the role of nuclear weapons in military strategies worldwide both at the conceptual and operational levels.
India is committed to accelerating the pace of civil nuclear energy production and increasing the share of civilian nuclear power in country's energy mix. Independent of international support to its civilian nuclear needs, India's quest for credible minimum deterrence would continue. At the same time, periodical review of strength of the strategic forces would remain relevant for defence preparedness.
How willing is the international community to integrate India into the prevailing nuclear trade arrangements would be seen in the implementation of the US-India nuclear deal. However, the international community cannot overlook India's position vis-à-vis the security realities of the international environment.
For almost five decades, the Cold War world witnessed a race for development and deployment of nuclear weapons under a grand dilemma - the possibility of 'use' or 'non-use' of nuclear weapons in any eventual military crisis. Had there been no review by major nuclear weapon states on the doctrines simply based on 'mutual assured destruction', the search for alternatives like limited, flexible or proportionate deterrent capabilities would not have started.
The process of review in diversifying the role of nuclear weapons itself led to changes in the size and nature of nuclear arsenals worldwide. The task of the military strategists also became complicated in terms of 'what type' and 'how many' numbers should be considered as sufficient for deterrence. The emphasis on numbers thus became significant.
Though the phase of bipolar rivalry between the Warsaw Pact and NATO has ended, stocks, albeit reduced, of their nuclear arsenals still exist. The efforts of N-5 states (nuclear weapon states as defined by the NPT) are now being channelised to develop cutting edge technologies. The emphasis is on enhancing the credibility of individual deterrent capabilities.
The continuing rationality for possession of nuclear weapons is still premised on the unpredictability of threat vulnerabilities. In the realm of realism, threat perceptions and force projections still remain as significant dimensions to validate the existence of deterrence. The complexity in conceptualizing nuclear deterrence arises due to the changing nature of security perceptions of states with nuclear weapons in the context of their own force capabilities.
While contesting about theoretical constructs on deterrence, in practice each country attempts to take adequate measures to ensure survivability of its existing arsenal. The survivability factor becomes more important for a country like India, which follows a doctrine of no-first-use (NFU). In addition to targeting strategies, therefore, numbers do matter in creating deterrence.
India faces security challenges primarily from two nuclear neighbours - Pakistan and China. In addition to an active fissile material production programme, Pakistan has not yet officially defined its doctrinal position and maintains ambiguity about its nuclear first-strike option. On the other hand, China holds a reserve of sufficient fissile stock to expand the size of its arsenal two to three times of its existing stockpile. As far as its deterrence strategy is concerned, Beijing maintains a qualified doctrine of NFU with 'limited deterrence'.
To uphold NFU and withstand a potential first-strike, India needs to address appropriately the number calculations, including for worst-case scenarios. At present India may have a slight edge over Pakistan's stock of weapons, but the Chinese fissile stockpile is estimated by nuclear experts to be many times that of India's. Military strategists can hardy afford to underrate the potential contingencies in terms of the survivability, which makes numbers matter.
In the international security calculus, the potential nuclear strategies of the N-5 seem at odds with their commitments for nuclear disarmament. The Bush Administration is determined to pursue a new deterrence policy. Its new nuclear posture envisages force preparedness against perceived threats at asymmetric levels of deterrence. Russia intends to develop and deploy new ICBMs, a new class of submarines and cruise missiles. Even France and UK are on advancement modes. France is currently engaged in the development of new nuclear powered submarines and the UK seems to be in need of replenishing its Trident systems. In the given scenario, it is pertinent for India to gauge the temperature in China as well. China's continuing efforts to modernize its missile forces will have long term security implications for India.
To establish even credible minimum deterrence against China, India needs to closely follow the dynamism attached to the notions of deterrence elsewhere in the world, which in turn affects China. Here again, numbers have a role to play.
At the operational level, the credibility of nuclear deterrence is viewed mainly through three aspects - weapons-grade fissile stock, delivery systems, and command and control mechanisms. Throughout the cold war, the five nuclear weapon states produced tons of weapons-grade fissile material and developed a wide range of missiles and bombers to meet any eventuality. The deployment strategies of the rival blocks in potential war theatres necessitated the installation of elaborate command and control systems.
Despite their deployments in own security conditions, countries like China and India can hardly afford to ignore the importance of reliable command and control systems.
Under these given complexities, India needs to go a long way in creating a credible minimum nuclear deterrent capability. The task ahead also includes, therefore, appropriately addressing the issue of number of nuclear weapons and fissile stock.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh concluded his two-day state visit to Uzbekistan on April 26, 2006. This was the second visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Tashkent since Uzbekistan's independence in August 1991. India and Uzbekistan signed seven agreements in the fields of energy, business, education, mineral prospecting and stepping up the joint fight against international terrorism, religious extremism and drug trafficking. This has undoubtedly increased Indian stakes in Central Asia.
Dr. Singh's visit has been a historic one as far as cooperation in the energy sector is concerned. Of the seven new agreements signed on April 26, three agreements specifying India's role in Uzbekistan's energy and mineral sectors are of particular importance. These provide exploration acreages to Indian companies without bidding, in return for an equal share in the revenue from any discovery. The significance of these three agreements arises from the fact that Uzbekistan is estimated to have 594 million barrels of proven oil reserves and an estimated 65-70 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. Uzbekistan is the second largest natural gas producer in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after Russia.
These agreements also mark a change in India's fortune in Central Asia. India's efforts to secure a niche for itself in Central Asian hydrocarbons have so far been unsuccessful. New Delhi had earlier tried to secure a share in the Kurmangazy field of Kazakhstan, but lost to China. The new agreements mark a breakthrough and will help ONGC Videsh and the Gas Authority of India Limited to put their plans of investment in Uzbekistan and Central Asia on the fast track. As far as increasing the share of nuclear energy in the Indian energy basket is concerned, one would like to see more cooperation between New Delhi and Tashkent. Uzbekistan is reported to have vast quantities of uranium. India needs to examine the option of buying uranium from Tashkent for its nuclear energy production requirements.
Conventional wisdom in India does not consider Central Asian energy resources seriously, pointing to the difficulties associated with transportation. In this regard, the realization of a transport corridor has to be pursued vigorously. Uzbekistan could be an important connecting point in this transport corridor. The new route connecting India to Central Asia via Mumbai - Chah Bahar - Zaranj - Delaran - Heart - Naibabad - Khairaton - Termez and further has high potential for success. India's Border Road Organisation has been building roads on this route, which is likely to be operational sooner than later. However, the threats from terrorists and extremists are still looming large on this route given the fact that the Taliban and their counterparts in Pakistan would not like to see regional cooperation picking up between Central and South Asia.
This brings in to focus the role of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT) in the current political space of the region. Both groups have been waging wars against secular governments. Their "struggle" is aimed at establishing an Islamic Caliphate in the region comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Xinjiang. There is credible information to indicate that some extremist elements from the Central Asian Republics have been found operating side-by-side with Pakistani militants in Jammu & Kashmir. There is a nexus between IMU-IMT and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, Taliban and Al Qaeda. It is not in India's security interests to be a mute witness to the revival and growth of religious extremism in Central Asia. New Delhi and Tashkent share common concerns over threats from religious extremism and cross-border terrorism.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Karimov identified drug trafficking, international terrorism, religious extremism and cross border terrorism as common threats faced by their nations. Opium production in Afghanistan accounts for 80 per cent of global output. And drug trafficking in Afghanistan has been the fountainhead of terrorist financing in the Central and South Asian regions. At the joint press conference on April 26, 2006 in Tashkent, President Karimov supported the Indian policy to eliminate these threats. Tashkent has been supportive of India's stance on various regional and international issues, like for instance the reconstruction programme in Afghanistan and the fight against international terrorism. The Indian experience in fighting terrorism and insurgencies could be of utility to Uzbekistan given the number of hot spots in the Ferghana Valley and other parts of Uzbekistan. In particular, the Indian experience with the use of Central Police Organisations and paramilitary forces is likely to be of considerable value to Tashkent.
President Karimov once again reiterated his country's support to India's permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council and to the resolution of the Jammu & Kashmir issue through bilateral talks between New Delhi and Islamabad. Tashkent completely ruled out a role for any third party either as mediator or facilitator for resolving the Jammu & Kashmir issue.
There have been a few trend-setting developments in the Central Asian geo-political landscape such as 9/11, the "Tulip Revolution" of March 2004 in Kyrgyzstan and the May 2005 developments in Andijon, Uzbekistan. While 9/11 provided an opportunity to the United States to get a foothold in the Central Asian region, the other two events have put US policy towards Central Asia in jeopardy. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Astana in July last year gave a clear message to the United States to wind down its military bases from the territories of its member states. The US had had to consequently depart from the Karshi-Khanabad base in Uzbekistan.
It is against this backdrop that India needs to play a proactive role in the prevailing geo-political situation in Central Asia. The region has been termed as 'extended neighbourhood' in the Indian strategic calculus. New Delhi has tremendous goodwill compared to any other major player in the region and is considered a benign neighbour. The Indian PM's visit to Tashkent has been a step forward in the right direction.
Another agreement signed on April 26, 2006 is for establishing the Uzbekistan-India Entrepreneurship Development Centre in Tashkent. This is a step forward in increasing economic ties between the two countries. The inauguration of the Jawaharlal Nehru Information Technology Centre in Tashkent by the Indian PM on April 26, 2006 is an important milestone as far as projecting Indian excellence in IT is concerned. Information Technology, hydrocarbons, North-South transport corridor, deepening of bilateral cooperation in the areas of small and medium scale business and tourism appear to be candidate areas in Indo-Uzbek economic cooperation with high potential for success.
Other steps that need to be taken to facilitate the expansion and strengthening of economic cooperation between New Delhi and Tashkent include the re-opening of a branch of the State Bank of India or the Punjab National Bank in Tashkent for efficient and cost-effective commercial transactions. Secondly, there is a firm need to establish an office of the CII/FICCI/ASSOCHAM for liaison and facilitation functions. In the soft power arena, India could consider extending professional assistance to restore Uzbek films, which are now stored in Moscow. The production of films in Russian/Uzbek and Hindi through joint Indo-Uzbek endeavours is also worthy of serious support.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai's four-day state visit to India from April 9-12, 2006 was the fourth since he was appointed Chairman of the Afghan interim administration in December 2001. His visit assumes significance in the backdrop of heightened violence in Afghanistan, the inclusion of Afghanistan in SAARC with India's facilitation, the recent political row between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the issue of cross-border terrorism, and the March 2006 visit of President Bush to the Subcontinent. It may also be mentioned here that Karzai's visit was a follow-up to the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's landmark visit to Kabul on August 28-29, 2005, which was in consonance with the growing significance of Afghanistan in India's strategic calculus. To say that the strong ties between the two countries since the overthrow of the Taliban are redefining the regional security and economic complex would be somewhat far-fetched, given that Pakistan remains a strong factor in the Indo-Afghan relationship and vice versa.
During Karzai's visit, India and Afghanistan signed three MoUs on education exchange programme, rural development, and on standardisation between the Bureau of Indian Standards and Afghanistan National Standardisation Authority. The first two MoUs are somewhat add-ons to the agreements signed earlier during the Indian Prime Minister's August 2005 visit to Kabul. It is noteworthy that during Manmohan Singh's visit, it was announced that India would adopt and develop 100 Afghan villages. This was apart from an agreement on small development projects. Similarly, with a view to providing Afghan students and professionals greater access to Indian academic and technical institutions, Singh had also announced 500 scholarships for Afghan students for university education. This was in addition to 500 short-term training fellowships under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme for Afghan men and women. The objective of the new MoUs was to probably further consolidate and institutionalise the expanded cooperation between the two countries in this sphere. Similarly, much of the political statements made, be it on the issue of joint fight against terrorism or the 'trilateral cooperation' between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, were a reiteration of what was agreed upon during the Singh's August 2005 visit to Kabul.
Given Afghanistan's need for long-term reconstruction assistance, Karzai's visit had a strong economic component. The visit was apparently more interactive and explorative in the economic sense. Apart from his senior cabinet ministers and members of the Afghan Parliament, Karzai was accompanied by a high-level delegation of Afghan businessmen who attended a joint business meeting hosted by FICCI, CII and ASSOCHAM. Karzai also visited the Hi-Tech City, Tata Consultancy Services Ltd., National Remote Sensing Agency, and the National Institute of Rural Development, all in Hyderabad.
India, which has been the largest donor among the regional countries to Afghanistan, pledged an additional US$50 million taking the total Indian assistance for Afghan reconstruction to $650 million. The Indian Prime Minister also offered to consider extending a $50 million Line of Credit facility to Afghanistan in order to promote bilateral trade and investment. However, the volume of bilateral trade remains abysmally low and is not commensurate with their growing relationship. Indo-Afghan trade is approximately $200 million, a negligible amount considering Afghanistan's overall trade of $5 billion during 2005. It is also noteworthy that despite problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan, their bilateral trade currently stands at $1.2 billion.
Given the denial of transit facility by Pakistan for Indian goods bound for Afghanistan, Karzai's proposal to Indian entrepreneurs to open production facilities in Afghanistan needs to be actively considered. Such a step would not only enhance trade between the two countries and open the way for Indian products to the large Central Asian markets, but it would also generate employment opportunities for unemployed Afghans. But at the same time the security of Indian nationals working in Afghanistan too needs to be considered.
The joint statement of April 10, 2006 surprisingly does not mention anything about energy cooperation. It is noteworthy that the previous Joint Statement issued during Singh's Kabul visit on August 28, 2005 clearly stated that, "the two leaders endorsed the need for greater consultation and cooperation in a future project of a Turkmenistan gas pipeline to India that would pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan." In fact, during a joint news conference with the Afghan President in Kabul, Prime Minister Singh had said that India needs both the Iranian and Turkmen pipelines and that there is no question of preferring one over the other since "India's needs for commercial energy are increasing at an explosive rate." The silence over energy cooperation in the recent Joint Statement issued on April 10 could have been due to the ongoing complex pipeline politics in the region, particularly US ire over the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, which remains more feasible in terms of cost and security than the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAP) pipeline. Afghanistan's predicament here is that it cannot afford to antagonise either the US or an important neighbour like Iran. India too has stakes in the Iranian gas pipeline, which is considered crucial to fulfil the country's growing energy demands.
Russia's efforts to control the energy routes and the pricing mechanism in the oil-producing former Soviet republics, and China's recent successes in accessing Central Asian energy resources, have exacerbated US-Russia rivalry in the region. Recently, Beijing and Turkmenistan signed an agreement to construct a gas pipeline between the two countries when Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov visited Beijing from April 2-7, 2006. China also pledged to buy 30 billion cubic meters of Turkmen natural gas annually for 30 years from 2009, apart from jointly exploring and developing Turkmen gas reserves.
Thus, the complexities arising out of the US-Iran stand off, US-Russia rivalry over Caspian energy, political instability in Afghanistan, and Pakistan's intransigence on the issue of regional economic integration, apart from economic and technical obstacles, have long denied India assured energy supplies from both the Caspian region and the Persian Gulf. Though progress on the proposed TAP and IPI pipeline has been made, particularly on the latter by Pakistan and India despite US opposition, it still has a long way to go. The US recently offered to grant funds and security guarantees for the TAP pipeline, provided Islamabad abandoned the proposed Iranian pipeline. The US is likely to keep up the pressure on Pakistan to drop the Iranian pipeline in favour of TAP pipeline. One would do well to remember that the US oil major UNOCAL had lobbied hard for this very pipeline in the early 1990s until the political upheaval in Afghanistan forced it abandon this project. Pakistan too would like to weigh its options between TAP, IPI and a pipeline from Qatar, and the consequences of its choice with regard to its relations with both Iran and US.
In the above context, it will be prudent to view Indo-Afghan ties in the larger context of regional political dynamics including the role of extra-regional powers, particularly the US. Indo-Afghan relations, though traditionally cordial, remain beset with certain limitations. Pakistan is as much a geographical reality between the two countries as India and Afghanistan are for Pakistan. Karzai's proposition that "a trilateral structure of cooperation" among the three countries "would release the best energy of this region and bring quicker progress and economic betterment to it" is consonant with the Indian view on regional cooperation. India and Afghanistan will have to channelise their bilateral strength to push for a cogent regional economic cooperation wherein all three countries realise their true economic potential.
Whether economic sense prevails or not in times to come in the countries of the Subcontinent, India cannot afford to remain tied within the confines of this region. Given that India's interests lie both within and beyond the frontiers of the Subcontinent, a strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan is an essential prerequisite.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is visiting Tashkent April 25-26, 2006 on a two-day state visit to Uzbekistan at the invitation of the Uzbek President, Islam Abduganievich Karimov who himself had visited India in April 2005. The visit will mark a new chapter in Indo-Uzbek relations.
The close friendly relations between Uzbekistan and India have their roots deep in history. The eminent Uzbek scholar Al-Beruni visited India in the 11th century and wrote the famous book, Kitab-Takkik Al-Hind - one of the most authoritative books on Indian society and culture. India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru had visited Uzbekistan in 1955 and 1961 when it was part of the erstwhile Soviet Union.
Uzbekistan's independence in August 1991 has led to the expansion and strengthening of bilateral ties between New Delhi and Tashkent in the political, economic and cultural spheres. India was the first country visited officially by President Karimov in August 1991. This was a historic visit outlining the framework for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries. Since then President Karimov has visited India thrice, in January 1994, May 2000 and April 2005. In May 1993, the then Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited Tashkent.
Manmohan Singh's visit is the second by an Indian Prime Minister to Tashkent since Uzbekistan's independence. The political dialogue between India and Uzbekistan has been regular and mutually beneficial. High-level exchanges have indeed set the tempo to chart out the scope and direction of cooperation and have also laid the foundation for understanding of each other's interests and core concerns. Both countries subscribe to common principles of inter-state conduct, peaceful settlement of all differences, and rejection of extremism of all forms as well as the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
India-Uzbek cooperation spans many areas such as economic and commercial, cultural, education and technical training in diverse disciplines, information technology, science and technology, agriculture and civil aviation, etc. India and Uzbekistan have signed as many as 60 agreements so far to promote cooperation in these diverse fields. It is expected that about eight agreements would be signed during Dr. Singh's ongoing visit. One of these could relate to Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) between ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) of India and Uzbekneftegaz Company of Uzbekistan. Military training and education is another important component of bilateral ties between New Delhi and Tashkent. An agreement to this effect was signed during President Karimov's visit to India in April 2005.
Politico-military cooperation is an important part of bilateral ties. Given the changed geo-political situation in Central Asia, this assumes greater significance. The "Tulip Revolution" of March 2004 in Kyrgyzstan, and the "May 12-14 Unrest in Andijon" in Uzbekistan have influenced the geopolitics of Central Asia. The summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Astana on July 5-6, 2005 (India was admitted in the SCO as Observer) also draws attention to these events. The summit's call on the US-led "anti-terrorist coalition" to define a deadline for its military presence on the territory of SCO member-countries is a strong signal to be noted in this regard. Washington initially tried to deflect SCO's call by claiming that it was guided by bilateral agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, Uzbek officials subsequently notified the United States on July 31, 2005 that US forces would have six months to vacate the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) air base, located 90 miles north of the Afghanistan border. The US military flew its last plane out from K-2 on November 21, 2005.
India and Uzbekistan have been playing a positive role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, which has been the launching ground for incursions carried out by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT). These groups have declared goals to overthrow the secular and constitutionally elected governments of the Central Asian Republics and establish an Islamic Caliphate in the region. Extremist elements from the Central Asian Republics have reportedly been found fighting along with Pakistani mujahideen in Jammu & Kashmir. There is a clear nexus among the Islamic Revival Parties, the Islamic Movement of Turkistan, Jamat-e-Islami of Pakistan, Taliban and al Qaeda. We can afford to ignore these developments in our neighbourhood only at our own peril. A victory for extremist forces in Central Asia will boost the morale of extremist forces in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere in India as well.
Given their shared concerns over threats from religious fundamentalism, terrorism, extremism and cross-border terrorism, India and Uzbekistan have underlined the need to further strengthen secular and democratic ideas in international relations. In this regard, they are coordinating their efforts through a Joint Working Group (JWG) on Combating International Terrorism. The last meeting of JWG on Combating International Terrorism took place during October 28-November 1, 2005 in New Delhi and the next meeting is likely to take place in Tashkent later this year. Both countries emphasise the need for an early conclusion of the Comprehensive Convention on Combating International Terrorism. It is expected that this issue will figure in the Joint Statement, likely to be issued at the end of Dr Singh's visit to Uzbekistan. The two countries share common values such as secularism, tolerance and strong opposition to the forces of fundamentalism and terrorism. Signing of the Extradition Treaty between New Delhi and Tashkent during President Karimov's visit to India in May 2000 was a significant development in this direction.
Energy security is paramount for a developing country like India, which has begun to grow at an accelerated pace. India's energy consumption is likely to grow at over 6 per cent per annum. Central Asian Republics could provide a modicum of energy security to India. Issues concerning energy are likely to figure prominently in talks between Dr. Singh and President Karimov. The main hurdle is how to bring hydrocarbons from Central Asia to India. In this regard, the issue of the transport corridor assumes significance. It is noteworthy that Uzbekistan will be an important connecting point in the new transport corridor between India and Central Asia, which is likely to come up soon. The new upcoming route connecting India to Central Asia via Mumbai - Chah Bahar - Zaranj - Delaran - Heart - Naibabad - Khairaton - Termez and further, has great potential. It will reduce the distance by 1500 kilometres when compared to the existing operational route, i.e., Mumbai-Bander Abbas-Mashhed-Turkmenabad (earlier Chahar Su)-Bukhara and further.
Uzbek entrepreneurs can make use of the considerable experience of Indian industry in areas such as textiles (both cotton and silk), pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, information technology and processing of agricultural products, to name only a few. Indian businessmen have already shown interest to invest in some of these areas. Bilateral trade in the past remained in the range of $30 to $40 million per annum. It reached $108.6 million in 2003, very largely in favour of Uzbekistan and $ 120.9 million in 2004. But it dropped to $ 61.1 million in 2005. Recently, the Inter-governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation between India and Uzbekistan met in March 2006 in New Delhi to discuss ways and means to exploit the economic potential that exists between New Delhi and Tashkent. Inauguration of the Jawaharlal Nehru Information Technology Centre in Tashkent, built with Indian assistance, by Dr. Singh tomorrow is a step further in enhancing bilateral cooperation. The Centre has been built within the framework of scientific and technology cooperation between the two countries.
In the field of defence, India had acquired six Ilyushin-78 in-flight refuelling aircraft from Uzbekistan. Indian aircraft are being regularly serviced at the Chekalov aircraft plant in Tashkent. There is great potential for co-operation between New Delhi and Tashkent in the aviation sector. The issue of military training and education will figure in bilateral talks between Dr. Singh and President Karimov. The Indian experience of fighting terrorism and insurgency could prove handy for Uzbekistan given the hotspots in Ferghana Valley and other parts of Uzbekistan.
Cultural ties constitute an important pillar of our bilateral relationship. There is a very active Indian cultural centre in Tashkent, which, besides working closely with many Uzbek organizations, also conducts regular classes in Indian classical dance "Kathak", Tabla, Yoga, Hindi language and Indian studies. It is rather difficult to separate the past from the present while discussing Indo-Uzbek cultural ties. The past feeds and enriches the present and provides the ambience for the warm relations that exist between the two countries.
In the final analysis, one can say that religious extremism and international terrorism would remain challenges to Central Asian security and stability. Indo-Uzbek cooperation would be an important part of the international coalition against such forces in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan appreciates the active and constructive stand taken by India on various regional and global issues, for example, the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the fight against international terrorism. Tashkent supports India's permanent membership at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and resolution of Jammu & Kashmir issue through bilateral talks between New Delhi and Islamabad. India has been a supporter of evolutionary democracy. In pursuing policies for successful economic development with equity, every nation would have to effectively base them on its own history, culture and traditional value systems. Imitative policies, which reflect the conditions in other countries, are not likely to be effective.
For Uzbekistan, India could emerge as a major market for its energy resources. Indications are that Uzbek enterprises and entrepreneurs would welcome Indian participation via joint ventures in areas like manufacture of electronic equipment, precision instruments, optical instruments, textiles, ready-made garments and leather goods. Uzbekistan is in a good position to supply items like phosphorous fertilizers, chemicals, aircraft and metals to India. Information Technology, hydrocarbons, North-South transport corridor, deepening of bilateral cooperation in the area of small and medium scale business and tourism appear to be candidate areas in Indo-Uzbek economic cooperation with high potential for success.
As the Russian thinking on its near abroad is crystallizing in the wake of the US withdrawal from Uzbekistan's Karshi-Khanabad airbase in late 2005, it appears that Moscow is aiming at strategic predominance in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region, though it seems ready to accept the reality of free market dynamics. But the fact of the matter is that Moscow has neither the will nor the resources to single-handedly resolve all the problems of the impoverished former Soviet republics of the region.
Two seemingly opposite strands mark Russia's policy towards this turbulent region on its southern underbelly. In view of the NATO and EU expansion on its western flank, Moscow finds it important to dig in its heels and bolster its pre-eminent strategic position in the Central Asian and Caspian Sea region in order to retain its status as a great power and an independent power centre in a multi-polar world. At the same time, in the changed political and economic context of the post-Cold War world, Moscow is neither willing nor is in a position to exercise Soviet-style exclusive control and shoulder the entire economic burden of the region.
Even critics of the Soviet Union concede that despite its rather skewed model of economic development, the Soviets had made a major contribution to the modernization, industrialization and economic and social development of Central Asia. Under the Soviet Union, the peoples of Central Asia made the transition from the medieval to modern era. However, the hefty federal subsidies that supported the social security system in Central Asia disappeared following the Soviet disintegration, resulting in deep socio-economic malaise and the emergence of a host of problems. Russia today has neither the intent nor the means to do what the Soviet Union earlier did. During the Soviet period the region was behind the Iron Curtain, isolated from the rest of the world, which is not the case today. All the major powers and important regional players have presence and stakes in the region. Russia aspires to engage them all, even as it plays the role of the chief regional balancer of power. Moscow has genuine apprehensions that instability on its southern periphery could have a detrimental impact on peace and security of adjacent Russian regions as well. Russia has already been battling separatism in its volatile Caucasus republic of Chechnya, which threatens to engulf the neighbouring areas also.
From time to time, Russia has tried to involve or has conceded to go along with, other international players in order to maintain stability in this region. The Shanghai-Five mechanism was devised in April 1996 - comprising Russia, China and the three bordering Central Asian republics, namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan - to resolve boundary disputes and adopt confidence building measures for stabilising the region. The Shanghai-Five later evolved into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Uzbekistan also became a member. In June 2004 Mongolia was given observer status in the SCO. And in July 2005, India, Iran and Pakistan were invited to join as observers. SCO, with its emphasis on combating terrorism, extremism and separatism, is widely seen as a forum in which Russia shares the leadership with China. Moscow and Beijing have a common interest in supporting each other against the pressure of the West and expanding NATO.
At the same time, Moscow is seeking to reassert its own regional security and economic influence as a bulwark against Chinese and Western ambitions. It is doing so at the bilateral level as well as through the mechanisms of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). Moscow plays the leading role in both these groupings. Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of the CSTO as well as of the EEC. In 2005, Moscow intensified the activities of the CSTO, which was granted observer status in the General Assembly of the UN. It was recognized by both the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the SCO. Efforts were made to begin military cooperation with NATO, especially in Afghanistan. On January 25, 2006, Uzbekistan also joined the EEC. Efforts are on to rope in Uzbekistan in the CSTO as well. Moreover, Russia has military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. On November 14, 2005 Russia and Uzbekistan signed the Treaty of Alliance Relations, which opened the way for Moscow acquiring base facilities in Central Asia's most populous country. Russia is strongly opposed to the appearance of outside, i.e., US/Western military presence in the oil-rich Caspian Sea region.
On the other hand, attempts have been made to engage the West through the mechanisms of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and the Russia-NATO Joint Council. Russia offered support to the US War against Terrorism in the wake of 9/11. Indeed, all the Central Asian countries extended support to the United States with the concurrence of Moscow. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan provided air bases at Manas airport and Karshi-Khanabad, respectively. But the Russians subsequently felt to their great chagrin that the "West went against its interests" in Central Asia. It was felt that Western support for the 'colour revolutions' in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan for regime change was also aimed at further squeezing out Russia from the region. Moreover, it was apprehended that the 'democratization' and 'regime change' policy, in the ultimate analysis, was also aimed at bringing about change within Russia itself. No wonder, Moscow has sought to tighten control over the activities of foreign-funded NGOs and foundations in Russia.
With the resurgence of Russia as a major energy provider and its growing accumulation of petro-dollars, Russian hydrocarbon companies are playing an increasingly active role in the region. Soviet-era oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia and the Caucasus move northwards and are connected to the Russian pipeline network. Russian companies are now involved in their repair and restoration as well as in the exploration of new blocks. In January 2006, the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom signed an agreement with Uzbekistan to acquire the three largest gas deposits of the country. A mechanism has been devised whereby Central Asian debts to Russia have been converted into investments. Russia has offered to invest US$ 2 billion in the Tajik economy in the course of the next five years mainly in the hydropower and aluminium sectors.
Russia is also the main source of military equipment and training to these countries and the main guarantor of security. However, China is making steady in-roads in the region, especially in the economic field through cheap consumer goods in return for raw material. Russian publicists and analysts agree that they have no answer to the growing Chinese role in the economic field and that they cannot stop this. The Russian-Chinese relationship in Central Asia is at best one of uneasy and competitive co-existence. The Russian political class realizes that Russia must adjust to the dynamics of the open market in the region. Indeed, it seems that Russia would welcome a number of countries - including India - to be involved in the fields of economy, trade, education, the development of science and technology and human resource development, and even "the spread of English language" to balance the growing Chinese activism. In the Russian perspective, "the more the merrier" seems to be the motto in the economic sphere of Central Asia and the Caucasus, especially so if they are also Russia's friends.
Former Liberian President Charles Taylor, wanted for war crimes by the international tribunal in Sierra Leone, was arrested on Wednesday in northern Nigeria on the Cameroon border. He was deported to Monrovia and from there transferred to UN custody in Sierra Leone. Just a day before his arrest he had disappeared from the villa in south-eastern Nigeria, where he had been living in exile since stepping down from power in 2003 as part of an arrangement brokered by AU, ECOWAS and other key international actors including the US to end 14 years of civil war in Liberia. He had disappeared after Nigeria announced that Liberia was free to take Taylor into custody. His disappearance caused an international outcry and raised concerns that he could be in a position to disturb the young democracy of Liberia, given his influence in Liberian politics and economy. In fact, immediately following Nigeria's announcement, the Liberian authorities arrested a number of Taylor's supporters from his National Patriotic Party amid fears that they may stage an armed uprising. But his capture by the Nigerian authorities averted this situation, which could have reignited the civil war in that country.
Ever since he granted Mr. Taylor asylum, the Nigerian president Mr. Obasanjo has been under immense US pressure to send Taylor to be tried for alleged crimes against humanity. But he had resisted sending Mr. Taylor to Sierra Leone, arguing that the terms of agreement stated that he would only extradite him following a request from an elected Liberian leader. Perhaps he wanted to avoid setting the precedent of a former African head of State facing war crimes charges in an international court. However, after the formal request of the newly elected Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the Nigerian President agreed to hand over Taylor to the UN backed special court in Sierra Leone. Even the Liberian President was under great American pressure to ask Nigeria to hand over Taylor to a Sierra Leone court. When Johnson-Sirleaf first came to power, putting Taylor under trial was not a priority; instead, reconstructing Liberia was uppermost in her agenda. But she had to succumb to the pressure of US, which is the source of aid needed to rebuild Liberia.
The US had been issuing warnings for a long time about its determination to extradite Taylor. It has been in the forefront of the move to have the former Liberian leader repatriated to answer war crimes charges at the tribunal in Sierra Leone. The special tribunal in Sierra Leone is different from other war crime tribunals. It has been set up with Sierra Leone's agreement and operates under both Sierra Leone domestic law and international humanitarian law. The court is beyond the control of the UN Security Council and is managed by countries - led by Britain and the US - which are funding it.
The tribunal had indicted Charles Taylor on 17 charges, which carried a sentence of life in prison. The indictment says he is responsible for the devastation of Liberia and neighbouring Sierra Leone as well as for the murder, rape, maiming and mutilation of more than a half million Sierra Leoneans. He is accused of starting a 14-year civil war in his country and unleashing mayhem on its citizens. He actively supported armed opposition groups in Sierra Leone, which included child fighters accused of committing multiple war crimes. He allegedly started the Sierra Leone war to obtain for his fighters access to its rich diamond fields. He later controlled the diamonds, timber and rubber-producing areas straddling the Liberian/Sierra Leonean border and substantially enriched himself. Even as an "elected" president, he used his control of the diamond trade to continue funding campaigns of destabilization in countries bordering Liberia. More importantly, his illegal diamond trade was also taken advantage of by the Lebanese and Arab community in Liberia and elsewhere to launder money used in financing major terrorist operations. He is also accused of harbouring the al-Qaida suicide bombers who attacked US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.
Now his arrest and subsequent trial seem to have brought his 16-year bloodstained life to a close and averted a feared renewal of conflict in Liberia. His rise and fall highlight the painful struggles of West African people who are determined to strive for peace in their countries despite their leaders. His trial would perhaps be welcome to the Liberian people, since for years they have been longing for peace and reconciliation. Liberia, once among the richer countries in West Africa, is now among the poorest. Long years of crisis have made the country a failed state, with 15,000 UN peacekeepers providing security for the new administration of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Stability is very crucial for the new Liberian president. With Taylor's imprisonment, the worries that his presence could have destabilized the country have been warded off for the time being. Presently the UN backed Sierra Leone court wants the Hague based ICC to host the trial since, according to the Liberian president, the court in the Hague would be a more conducive environment for Taylor's trial rather than Liberia's neighbourhood.
Taylor's trial sets a precedent in that it is the first time that an African head of state has to face an international war crimes tribunal for crimes against humanity - another step in growing efforts to make leaders accountable for their actions. So far no African leader has raised his voice to call for Taylor's surrender to the UN special tribunal. Many African leaders are apprehensive of trying former presidents or dictators, apparently worried that they could be the next to be accused of human rights abuses or other crimes. Others fear that a push to try toppled leaders would encourage those in power to more fiercely resist democratic change. But as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out, Taylor's capture and trial do not only close a chapter but also send a powerful message to the region that would-be warlords will ultimately pay a price. Charles Taylor's case is thus loaded with implications for African presidents including coup leaders and others accused of human rights violations.
It remains to be seen how the USA would "help India become a major world power" as the US Secretary of State stated a year ago, but Washington is certainly contributing to augment India's trans-national military reach in terms of its amphibious sealift and airlift capabilities. Last year, the US agreed in principle to sell India its Austin-class LPD (Landing Platform Dock) USS Trenton at a cost of US$ 42 million. The 17,000-ton Trenton is still in commission with the US Navy and is presently being refitted at Norfolk, Virginia. Indian officials are scheduled to visit the US in mid-April to finalise the government-to-government deal under the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme. They may also discuss the details of the ongoing refit, including removal of existing weapons such as the Phalanx air-defence system and 3-inch guns. Once the vessel is delivered to India in early 2007, it would need to be fitted with weapon-systems presently in use on Indian naval ships.
Amphibious vessels are essentially 'Trojan (sea) Horses', carrying a large number of troops with equipment, vehicles and cargo (depending on the mission) to be discharged onto the shores of the 'objective area'. Presently, the most capable ship that the Indian Navy possesses for this role is the 3,600-ton Magar-class Large Landing Ship Tank (LST-L). It can carry up to 500 troops, 15 tanks and 8 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC). It can also operate two medium-lift helicopters, which are primarily meant for 'inserting' a small team of Special Forces (marine commandos). To discharge its cargo and most of the troops, it needs to be 'beached' through its 'bow-door' (in the front). In contrast, a LPD like the Trenton is a 'better Trojan Horse' - its carrying capacity is roughly double that of the LST-L and it has a greater endurance of 7,700 nautical miles at a speed of 20 knots, as opposed to the LST-L's 3,300 nm at 14 knots. More importantly, it has a large platform to operate up to six medium-lift helicopters and a floodable 'well-deck' at its stern for housing smaller landing craft or hovercraft. This implies that a LPD does not need to 'beach' to discharge its personnel and cargo. The vessel also serves as an effective Command and Control platform during amphibious operations. Hence, the LPD buy represents a quantum jump in the Navy's integral sealift and airlift capabilities.
In the aftermath of the December 2004 Tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy conducted large-scale relief operations to provide succour to the affected littoral states. The Indian Navy's relief operations were commendable by all standards, particularly its rapid response and innovative use of survey vessels as hospital ships. However, it also exposed a serious void in terms of the capacity for integral sealift and airlift, which probably triggered the LPD transfer. The US wanted to keep India 'onboard' for the 'coalition-operations' in the Indian Ocean, even beyond disaster relief. India's interests may have converged with those of the US on this, but there were other reasons as well. Although India does not harbour hegemonic military ambitions overseas, its amphibious capabilities are in dire need of upgradation.
Besides capacity-augmentation and extended reach, the current trends in amphibious warfare have brought forth new operational imperatives. The first is 'Vertical Envelopment', viz., the speedy airlift of troops to achieve surprise and facilitate ship-to-shore movement. Though not a new concept, it is gaining greater currency. Another is 'Standoff Beaching', which implies that major amphibious vessels must remain away from the adversary's shores, which would be well defended, and rather use smaller fast craft for the actual landing. LPDs are best suited for these requirements. There are other imperatives as well. India's own security is enmeshed with the well being of the Indian Ocean littoral states that do not yet have adequate capabilities to fend for themselves. Furthermore, India is beginning to acquire vital economic and other stakes overseas, which would need to be protected in case these are threatened. The LPD-type of ships would provide a rapid-response heavy sealift and airlift to meet these requirements.
Although Trenton is 35 years old and would have only about 15 years of residual life, the vessel would provide the Indian Navy with invaluable expertise to operate a vastly different platform and enable refinement of its operational concepts for amphibious missions. (Of course, it would also entail acquisition of hovercraft/landing-craft and more transport helicopters to be used in conjunction). Besides, the LPD design could also be studied by Indian shipyards for indigenous construction in the future. Reports indicate that plans are on the anvil to build similar vessels at Kolkata. Although relatively expensive, such versatile vessels are particularly suited for the presently unthinkable out-of-area (OOA) contingencies.
